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Liberal Equality: Political not Erinaceous 
 
Matthew Clayton 
Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick 
Email: m.g.clayton@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
Ronald Dwokin’s Justice for Hedgehogs defends liberal political 
morality on the basis of a rich account of dignity as constitutive of 
living well. This article raises the Rawlsian concern that making 
political morality dependent on ethics threatens citizens’ political 
autonomy. Thereafter, it addresses whether the abandonment of 
(erinaceous) ethical foundations signals the demise of Dworkin’s 
liberalism and explores the possibility of laundering his conception 
so as to facilitate a marriage between the political philosophies of 
Rawls and Dworkin. The article finishes by rebutting some objections 
Dworkin raises against Rawls’s account of public reason. 
 
Keywords: Dworkin, Rawls, liberalism, dignity, liberal equality, 
public reason 
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My aim in this article is to examine how in Justice for Hedgehogs 
Ronald Dworkin understands the place of ethics within political 
morality, and to relate Dworkin’s view to the distinct view 
developed by John Rawls in Part Three of A Theory of Justice and 
Political Liberalism. As is familiar, Rawls’s view focusses on the 
stability of his conception of Justice as Fairness and other liberal 
conceptions of justice and attempts to show how their demands are 
congruent with individuals’ pursuit of their own good. In doing so, 
Rawls assumes that we have an interest in living well and that, even 
if we didn’t, the project of pursuing good lives is dear to us. If liberal 
justice failed to harmonise with that pursuit we might, then, have a 
sound reason to reject it. To avoid that possibility, Rawls attempts to 
show how liberal political institutions, which inevitably produce 
diverse conceptions of how to live well, can nevertheless still be 
affirmed as legitimate by an ‘overlapping consensus’ of citizens 
committed to freedom and equality (1999, part three; 1996; 2001, §§. 
11, 54-60). 
 By contrast, in Justice for Hedgehogs Dworkin’s project is more 
ambitious and audacious than Rawls’s.1 Like Rawls, Dworkin 
attempts to explain why we need not choose between living well and 
honouring our duties to other citizens. But unlike Rawls, who sought 
to avoid engagement with religious and ethical controversies for the 
sake of consensus on political principles, Dworkin argues that a 
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political morality is defective if it does not rest on a rich account of 
ethics. 
 For the purposes of this article, I follow Dworkin’s distinction 
between ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’. Thus, moral questions concern ‘how 
we ought to treat others’, ethical ones how we ‘lead good lives for 
ourselves’ (p. 191). As Dworkin acknowledges, although ‘ethics’ and 
‘morality’ are sometimes understood as having broader meanings, it 
is the distinction between these two questions that is of central 
importance.  
Dworkin deploys the metaphor of the tree of morality in 
which political morality is a branch of a general moral theory, which 
in turn grows from the idea of an ethical life (p. 5). As with a tree 
whose trunk is nourished by the photosynthesis in its leaves, the 
different branches of morality inform ethics, because living well 
depends on respecting the rights of others. However, unlike Rawls’s 
political liberalism, in which the branch that is political morality is 
‘freestanding’ of any particular ethical conception, a ‘module’ as 
Rawls describes it that can be slotted into many different ethical 
foundations, for Dworkin the ethical trunk and political branches are 
‘integrated’ in the sense that the truth about what it is to live well in 
part determines our obligations to each other. Indeed, Dworkin tells 
us that integration is a ‘philosophical necessity’ (p. 264). An account 
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of political morality is inadequate to the extent that it is not 
integrated with the rest of morality and ethics. 
 My aim in this article is to explore the differences between 
these rival conceptions of the place of ethics within political morality, 
proceeding as follows. First, I summarise the central features of 
Dworkin’s ‘integration’ conception of value. Second, I raise the 
Rawlsian concern that making political morality dependent on such 
a detailed account of ethics threatens citizens’ political autonomy. 
Third, I examine the question of whether abandoning wholehearted 
integration signals the demise of Dworkin’s liberalism and explore 
the possibility of laundering Liberal Equality to free it of its 
dependence on particular ethical foundations so as to facilitate a 
marriage between Rawls’s and Dworkin’s liberal egalitarian accounts 
of political morality. Finally, I address some of the objections 
Dworkin raises against Rawls’s account of public reason and try to 
show how they might be resisted if we interpret Rawls differently. 
 
1. Erinaceous Liberalism 
Over the last few decades, Dworkin has developed and defended an 
attractive conception of liberal politics. In Justice for Hedgehogs, he 
places centre stage the idea of the ‘unity of value’. The particular 
hedgehog Dworkin wants to serve is dissatisfied with the fox who 
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takes at face value the apparent conflict between different political 
ideals like liberty, equality and democracy. The hedgehog believes 
that these ideals do not, after all, conflict but are instead different 
mutually supportive aspects of the same idea of how we should live 
together as a political community. In support of the hedgehog, 
Dworkin offers an account of the various liberal political ideals and 
virtues in which no conflict arises amongst them.  
The hedgehog denies, in addition, that there is a conflict at a 
different normative level, between acting justly and living a good 
life. The fox points to various instances in which these two ideals 
seem to conflict, such as when an individual must sacrifice his life in 
a war waged in defence of just political institutions, or give up her 
personal fortune for the sake of a more equal society. But Dworkin’s 
erinaceous instincts motivate him to interpret the idea of living well 
in a way that is consistent with and, indeed, shapes our conceptions 
of morality and justice. As we shall see, it is at this juncture that the 
contrast between political and erinaceous liberalism is most stark. 
To grasp the nature of Dworkin’s account it is worth noting an 
array of different conceptions of how living well relates to acting 
justly. First, there is the vulpine view described above, which accepts 
the possibility of a conflict between the imperatives of political 
morality and living well. Among this family of views are those that 
assert that if such a conflict arises then political morality always or 
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normally defeats our reasons to pursue our own well being. In his 
Just So story (pp. 15-19), Dworkin calls this ‘the morality of self-
abnegation’, the emblematic version of which is utilitarianism (p. 18). 
One could, of course, take the opposite view and argue that 
attending to the claims of others always or normally loses out to 
fashioning a good life for oneself. The extreme version of that 
position, which Dworkin calls ‘the ethics of self-assertion’, that is 
sometimes (controversially) associated with Nietzsche, is that the 
demands morality purports to place on us are in fact bogus and there 
is, accordingly, no real conflict after all (p. 18). And there are 
moderate positions that treat moral and ethical reasons as more 
evenly balanced such that we ought sometimes to attend to the 
claims of others, sometimes to our own ethical needs and goals, 
when the two conflict. 
In addition to these conflict views, there are different views 
that deny the possibility of conflict: ‘philosophies of self-affirmation’ 
(pp. 15-16). Dworkin discusses two prominent examples, which, 
following his taxonomy, we may label ‘incorporation’ and 
‘integration’ views (pp. 202-203). His example of incorporationism 
involves adherents of certain religions who believe that living well 
requires us to follow the moral code created or identified by their 
gods. The code provides us with ideals and principles about how we 
ought to treat each other and our task is to live well by honouring 
 7 
them and pursuing our own well being within their constraints. 
Crucially, however, to identify the right code we need not ask 
whether its moral principles are responsive to our interest in living 
well. Reflection on what we owe to others, or what through faith or 
scripture our gods tell us that we owe to others, is sufficient. 
By contrast, integrationists claim that there is a two-way 
relationship between living well and acting morally. In particular, 
they claim that the content of our duties to each other is ‘fixed at 
least in part by the independent character of ethical responsibility’ 
(p. 202). 
Dworkin develops his rich integration model of ethics and 
morality (including political morality) over a number of chapters and 
there is space here to summarise only their headline moves so as to 
characterise the contrast with political liberalism. First, at the outset 
he distinguishes between ‘having a good life’ and ‘living well’ (pp. 
195-202).  The reconciliation of ethics and morality is, he observes, 
unlikely if we focus on having a good life, because the goodness of a 
life is affected by luck. If I happen to find myself in an environment 
in which morality requires me to sacrifice my life or leave my 
important projects unrealised, then it is implausible to think that I do 
not suffer a bad by complying with morality. Similarly, a life of 
poverty may be less good in a variety of ways than one afforded the 
diverse opportunities that stolen money can buy. 
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However, to reconcile ethics and morality, Dworkin asks us to 
focus not on the ethical question of ‘what makes one’s life go better 
or worse?’, but rather the different question, ‘how should I live?’. 
Those two questions are connected but not identical. Living well, 
Dworkin tells us, ‘means striving to create a good life, but only subject 
to certain constraints essential to human dignity’ (p. 195, emphasis 
added). Because living well includes honouring certain constraints, 
the prospects for its reconciliation with morality are promising, and 
Dworkin argues at length that these constraints support the adoption 
of particular principles of morality. Specifically, the ethical 
constraints in question are those of ‘self-respect’ and ‘authenticity’, 
which when elaborated properly, generate moral and political 
principles that regard everyone’s life as having equal importance and 
confer the right and duty on each individual to make her life a 
success. 
The first constraint of dignity is ‘self-respect’, which is the 
requirement that one acts from the conviction that it is important that 
one’s life is well lived. Indeed, Dworkin argues that we cannot make 
sense of our failures or successes in life without believing it 
objectively, and not merely subjectively, important to live well (pp. 
205-209). Dignity’s second ethical requirement is ‘authenticity’, 
which demands individual self-expression, ‘seeking a way to live 
that grips you as right for you and your circumstance’ (p. 209). You 
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do not live well if the relationships and projects you pursue are 
chosen for you by others or if you do not bother to assess for yourself 
whether they are worthy of pursuit. To live an authentic life the 
individual must endorse the goals she pursues on the basis of serious 
reflection about their merits (pp. 209-214, 102-122). 
These two aspects of dignity are necessary conditions of living 
well. Dworkin’s next key move is to show how they motivate and 
shape moral and political principles. He invokes what he calls 
‘Kant’s principle’, that self-respect implies treating everyone else’s 
life as equally as important as one’s own, which he defends by 
rejecting arguments that try to establish that objective ethical 
importance attaches to some particular individual or group and by 
rebutting the claim that the principle of equal importance is merely a 
contingent norm of democratic society (pp. 255-260). And because it 
is objectively important that everyone lives authentically, dignity’s 
transformation into a fundamental moral principle supports a liberal 
interpretation of the moral and political ideals we have reason to 
adopt.  
Dworkin devotes individual chapters in the remainder of the 
book to explain the implications of his conception of dignity for 
various issues that have attracted the attention of philosophers: the 
extent of our duty to come to the aid of those in dire need, what may 
be done to others, what we may do when our actions affect the 
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opportunities or welfare of others, whether promise-keeping is 
obligatory, questions concerning associative and political obligations, 
and a range of issues concerning how we might characterise and 
defend particular conceptions of equality, liberty, democracy and 
law. With regard to political morality, the respect and authenticity 
requirements of dignity play out as the twin principles of equal 
concern and individual responsibility to make a success of one’s life, 
and Dworkin asks us to consider his conception of justice, Liberal 
Equality, as the best interpretation of those principles.  
To give just one example of how ethics shapes political 
morality, consider his account of justice, which recommends an 
equal distribution of resources rather than welfare. The chief reason 
why welfarist metrics of interpersonal comparison are inadequate, 
according to Dworkin, is that they employ a particular judgement 
about what makes people’s lives go better or worse; they rank the 
success of different people’s lives according to that welfarist 
standard and compensate for disadvantage on that basis (p. 355). The 
political use of such a metric for judging the success of people’s lives 
is, he argues, a kind of usurpation of the project of defining how to 
live, a denial of individuals’ special responsibility to define for 
themselves what it means to live well, as required by authenticity 
(pp. 354-356). To judge questions of justice in a manner that is 
respectful of authenticity and special responsibility we require a 
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conception of advantage that exhibits ‘continuity’ with individuals’ 
distinctive beliefs about whether their lives are well lived. Equality of 
resources satisfies that requirement, Dworkin argues, because the 
compensation it recommends by way of the redistribution of wealth 
or other resources for disadvantages with respect to health, ability or 
market luck is sensitive to people’s own judgements about what is 
valuable (pp. 354-362). 
 
2. Rawlsian Worries 
Erinaceous liberalism might be the best account that has yet been 
developed of how attractive political principles follow from a rich 
and appealing conception of ethics. But should we adopt it as our 
official political morality? 
 Let us call our official political morality the set of political 
ideals and principles that, together with their justifications, guide our 
politics. Those ideals and principles might be expressed in the 
preamble to our constitution and they justify the adoption of 
particular institutions for the legislative, judicial and executive 
branches of government. They may also serve us as citizens in 
shaping our orientation to our political regime, by offering us 
arguments for its adoption, for example, thereby enabling us to see 
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that our politics serve us rather than impose values on us that we 
find alien (Rawls 2001, pp. 3-5). 
 It might be thought that the political theory that draws on the 
right (comprehensive) account of the requirements of living well 
ought to be our official political morality. However, Rawls argues 
that this natural thought is, nevertheless, mistaken. We ought not 
appeal to ‘the whole truth’, he claims, because doing so would 
jeopardise citizens’ political autonomy. In the Rawlsian conception it is 
important that free and equal citizens affirm the rules that constrain 
them and the foundational ideals that justify those rules (Rawls 1996, 
pp. 66-68). 
 Rawls famously argues for ‘political’ conceptions of justice 
and legitimacy. Such conceptions do not depend on the truth or 
falsity of any particular conception of ethics but, instead, are 
presented as independent ideals of political morality that might be 
adopted by citizens who affirm very different, perhaps incompatible, 
ethical convictions. Rawls’s argument for ‘political’ conceptions of 
justice and the use of ‘public reason’ within them depends in part on 
his observation that a society that protects the range of civil and 
political freedoms that are familiar in liberal societies inevitably 
exhibits pluralism of conviction with respect to ethics and its 
relationship to morality. Put crudely, ethical pluralism is the 
predictable consequence of individuals living under social and 
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political institutions that satisfy their interests in developing and 
deploying an appropriate sense of justice and the ability to lead an 
ethical life that is reflectively chosen. Given such pluralism, citizens 
can affirm the laws that constrain them in the right way only if those 
laws and their rationale do not rest on ideals and arguments that are 
rejected by citizens with those interests. Consequently, his 
recommendation is that our official political morality should stand 
free of such disputes. 
 Consider, for example, Dworkin’s distinction between 
incorporation and integration views of the relationship between 
ethics and morality. The evidence suggests that incorporationists 
who believe it appropriate to read off their political morality from 
scripture or alight on it through revelation, rather than by an 
assessment of what kind of morality would serve our ethical 
interests, are a stable constituency of liberal society. Were integration 
written up as the official philosophical doctrine of that political 
community, it would deprive incorporationists of the opportunity to 
affirm their politics as their own. In these circumstances, Rawlsians 
claim that our reason to respect individuals’ political autonomy, 
understood in the sense of their affirmation of the constraints under 
which they live, gives us reason to refuse to search for the whole 
truth about ethics and its relationship to morality. Accordingly, even 
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if true, erinaceous liberalism should not be the official philosophical 
conception of a liberal political community. 
 The rejection of Dworkin’s account of political morality as our 
official political doctrine does not, however, imply that it has no role 
to play in an ideal society. In the first place, it is open for Rawlsians 
to try to prise the political ideals and principles Dworkin proposes 
from the controversial ethical foundations he elaborates; to present 
them, instead, as standing free of his integration account of ethics 
and morality. Laundering Dworkin’s liberalism in that way would 
make it a candidate for adoption as our official political doctrine 
given Rawls’s constraints. I undertake that laundering strategy in the 
next section. 
 Whatever the merits of that strategy it is worth noting that 
Dworkin’s ethical defence of liberal politics might figure within an 
ideal Rawlsian society in two other ways. First, it has a place in what 
Rawls calls the ‘background culture’ of society (Rawls 1996, pp. 13-
14; 211 n. 42). Even if the validity of our political principles does not 
depend on their being integrated with self-respect and ethical 
authenticity, the expression and examination of Dworkin’s view in 
non-political forums remains permissible and, arguably, desirable. A 
well-ordered Rawlsian political system would neither validate nor 
gainsay integration as the right way to relate to liberal political 
convictions, still less the particular kind of integration Dworkin 
 15 
envisages. Nevertheless, given its richness and plausibility, 
individuals may have good reason to advertise its merits within the 
background culture. In addition, if Dworkin is right that his account 
is the best justification of liberal politics, then his account provides 
free and equal citizens with the great service of enabling them to see 
how their political principles are most attractive when integrated 
with ethics. Dworkin offers a convincing account of intellectual 
responsibility that involves the rejection of various leading 
approaches to objectivity about value and he argues for the need to 
examine, interpret and worry about the beliefs one holds. For 
example, it may well be true that the most responsible way, perhaps 
the best way, to adopt and hold political principles is to accept that 
questions about value are independent of questions about the non-
moral world (‘Hume’s Principle’, Dworkin calls it).  
As a handbook for responsible individuals, then, Dworkin’s 
account may be unrivalled. Intellectually responsible citizens will 
engage in liberal politics and defend their principles because they 
believe them to be true. They may well have the whole truth on their 
side. According to Rawlsians, however, that does not justify them 
imposing the whole truth on others who reject their account of 
intellectual responsibility and the integration of value: it would be 
unjust for an integrationist to require other citizens to reflect in the 
way he thinks is demanded by ethical responsibility, for example.2 
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But he is not prevented from acting on the whole truth in his own 
life. 
 A second place for Dworkin’s integration account is as part of 
what Rawls calls ‘the wide view of public political culture’ (1999b, 
pp. 591-594). In his final statement of the idea of public reason, Rawls 
accepts that the political articulation of religious and general ethical 
arguments, like Dworkin’s appeal to Kant’s principle or the ethical 
constraint of authenticity to justify liberal politics, is permissible, and 
perhaps shrewd, if governed by what he (Rawls) calls ‘the proviso’. 
Such arguments, he says, ‘may be introduced in public political 
discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political 
reasons—and not reasons solely given by comprehensive doctrines—
are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the 
comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support’ (Rawls 
1999b, p. 591). The Rawlsian hope is that those who disagree in the 
integration versus incorporation debate might nevertheless share 
liberal political values associated with a conception of cooperation 
between free and equal citizens. The public political articulation of 
an individual’s particular ethical convictions, if consistent with the 
proviso, is valuable because it gives others assurance that her 
commitment to those political values and public reason is secure and 
expressed in good faith. It serves that function because it enables 
others to appreciate that her liberal convictions are deeply grounded 
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in her fundamental philosophical beliefs (Rawls 1999b, pp. 592-594). 
In that way, erinaceous liberalism has a role to play within our 
political discourse, even if it is not our official political doctrine.  
 
3. Laundering Liberal Equality 
I have argued that Rawls’s constraints on political reasoning do not 
require us to abandon Dworkin’s ethical argument for liberal 
equality, but they do imply that we should reject it as our official 
doctrine. In this section, I return to the suggestion I made above, that 
many of Dworkin’s arguments for liberal equality can be interpreted 
as ‘political’ in the Rawlsian sense and, for that reason, those aspects 
of his account are suitable for endorsement as elements of our official 
political doctrine. That laundering suggestion has two parts. First, 
dignity might be presented as an ideal of political morality that, in 
Rawls’s sense, stands free of controversial ethical foundations. 
Second, the arguments within Dworkin’s conception of politics, 
Liberal Equality, can be offered as political arguments in Rawls’s 
sense. In particular, his account of equality of resources, I shall argue, 
is right because it does not rely on the truth of particular ethical 
conceptions but, instead, seeks to accommodate different views of 
ethics within its account of advantage. 
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(i) Dignity as a Freestanding Ideal of Political Morality 
Dignity can be deployed as an ethical or moral idea. As an ethical 
constraint it demands self-respect and authenticity. As a moral ideal 
it asserts that everyone’s life has equal importance but that each has a 
special responsibility for her own life. I have briefly reviewed 
Dworkin’s integration argument for the morality of dignity in which 
ethical dignity figures prominently. My suggestion now is that we 
might adopt dignity as the foundational ideal of a political conception 
of justice and legitimacy.  
Understood as the foundation of a political conception, 
dignity is presented as freestanding of disputes about how we might 
identify and pursue a good life. Presented in that way, the ideals of 
equal importance and special responsibility may be affirmed by 
incorporationists and integrationists alike. Consider equal 
importance, for example. Dworkin’s integration view derives that 
ideal from the first person observation that my living well matters 
objectively and the recognition that there is nothing special about my 
life in virtue of it being mine or my membership of a particular 
religion or ethnicity. By contrast, incorporationists may affirm equal 
importance for different reasons: equality in the eyes of their god as 
documented in their spiritual text, for instance, or as an axiom of the 
moral code they follow. 
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doctrines deny that everyone’s life has equal importance in the eyes 
of God yet retain the belief that it has equal importance from the 
point of view of political morality. A religious group might think it is 
God’s chosen people but nonetheless believe that the government 
should treat its citizens as equals regardless of religious affiliation. 
To be sure, in his discussion of the foundation of human 
rights, Dworkin sets out reasons to be sceptical of certain religious 
foundations of political morality, such as divine command theories 
(pp. 339-344). The soundness of his case against those religious views 
is not my present concern. My modest aim is merely to point out that 
equal importance as a political ideal is acceptable to various 
incorporationists and can, thereby, serve as the basis for a conception 
of political morality that might generate a Rawlsian ‘overlapping 
consensus’.  
Similar claims can be made on behalf of special responsibility. 
Dworkin helpfully clarifies the meaning of responsibility by 
distinguishing between several kinds (pp. 102-104). It is assignment 
and liability responsibility that are central to liberal political morality. 
A person is assignment-responsible when she has a duty to attend to 
some matter at hand, as when an individual is responsible for saving 
a drowning child from a shallow pond, or when no one else has the 
duty to attend to some matter, as when an individual has 
responsibility for pursuing his own goals. An individual has liability 
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responsibility when she has a duty to compensate others for the 
damage she has caused or when she ought to bear the costs herself of 
a foolish decision she took. For Dworkin, assignment responsibility is 
a central part of his integration model, because it is a requirement of 
living well. Successfully responding to the challenge of living well 
requires me to do certain things; if others satisfy my goals on my 
behalf then I have not performed, and living well is constituted by a 
particular kind of performance. But assignment responsibility and 
accepting liability for one’s decisions are also features of the major 
religions of the world, which assert that ultimately it is individuals 
who face the task of coming to appreciate god’s importance and that 
nonbelievers are liable to bear at least some of the costs of not being 
at one with god.  
Dignity as an ideal of political morality, then, figures in 
incorporation as well as integration moral conceptions. Since that is 
the case, it is available to political liberals to adopt it as a freestanding 
ideal of political morality from which we may argue for particular 
political principles. 
 
(ii) Liberal Equality as a Freestanding Account of Justice 
Now consider Dworkin’s account of political values, which includes 
interpretations of the nature of equality, liberty and democracy 
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among other concepts. One striking feature of his account that is 
particularly attractive from a political liberal point of view is its 
sensitivity to people’s distinctive ambitions and ethical beliefs. This 
‘ambition-sensitivity’ goes beyond the commonplace thought within 
liberal philosophy that justice demands the protection of individuals’ 
freedom to develop, express and pursue their convictions about how 
best to live. Dworkin extends the idea to the very heart of his 
conception of what citizens owe to one another by asking us to 
identify individuals’ entitlements by reference to the so-called ‘envy 
test’, which evaluates whether anyone, in the light of her own ethical 
commitments, would prefer to have what someone else has.  For 
example, in his imaginary island auction everyone bids for the items 
she believes will enable her to pursue her distinctive goals and, 
because everyone enjoys equal bidding power, the outcome is that 
no one prefers what anyone else has. Leaving aside for the moment 
the question of how to deal with natural or social inequalities, 
Dworkin explains that the envy test is the best distributive 
interpretation of the ideals of equal concern and special 
responsibility. Specifically, it does not impose any collective 
judgement about ethical success but devolves those judgements to 
citizens themselves (pp. 356-357; see also Dworkin 2000, ch. 7). 
 In his earlier, more elaborate account of egalitarian justice, 
Dworkin criticises those, like G. A. Cohen, who offer discontinuous 
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accounts of interpersonal comparison. The discontinuity approach 
asserts that even if an individual does not regard himself as worse 
off than someone else in virtue of the more expensive ambitions he 
has, that does not settle the question of whether he suffers a 
disadvantage (Dworkin 2000, pp. 294-296). In Cohen’s example, Paul 
should be compensated for his photographic ambitions that are more 
costly to fulfil than Fred’s preference for fishing, even when Paul 
believes that his life goes better than Fred’s notwithstanding Fred’s 
higher preference-satisfaction (Cohen 1989, p. 923). One counter-
intuitive feature of the discontinuity approach, Dworkin observes, is 
that it claims that an individual with expensive tastes may be 
regarded as disadvantaged in a way that generates a duty on the part 
of the community to compensate her even in cases in which she 
believes her life is more successful than those of others in the absence 
of greater income (Dworkin 2000, pp. 287-296; 2004, pp. 339-350; 
Williams 2002; Clayton 2000; Hansen and Midtgaard 2011). 
 By contrast, Dworkin’s continuity approach avoids that 
counter-intuitive result by allowing ‘us to cite, as disadvantages and 
handicaps, only what we treat in the same way in our own ethical 
life’ (2000, p. 294). In the envy test for inequality, individuals bring 
their own distinctive ethical convictions to bear on the question of 
whether they are more or less disadvantaged compared to others. 
From her own particular first-person perspective each asks herself 
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whether she would prefer to have what someone else has in the light 
of what matters to her. Dworkin’s account of equality as resources, 
then, does not, as some have thought, list a set of goods that are 
deemed valuable regardless of what individuals value, but defines 
resources as those items that intrinsically or instrumentally matter to 
people (1990, pp. 106-110). In that way it is responsive to the 
different particular ethical views of individuals and avoids imposing 
upon them a judgement about what is ethically valuable. 
The continuity approach to distribute justice is relevant to my 
laundering of Liberal Equality in the following way. Citizens of a 
free society disagree about the good life. Some regard preference-
satisfaction as constitutive or indicative of how well a life is going. 
However, others do not regard the fact that their lives exhibit less 
preference-satisfaction than they might as a reason to change their 
ambitions or goals so as to improve their satisfaction, and they do 
not believe that preference-satisfaction is either constitutive or 
indicative of living well or leading a good life. Given this 
disagreement about how to judge whether different people’s lives go 
well, Rawlsians need a way of identifying whether individuals are 
advantaged or disadvantaged that can serve them in deciding what 
citizens are due that does not depend on controversial ideals of what 
living well involves. The appeal of the continuity approach is that it 
succeeds in that respect. It refuses to judge citizens as disadvantaged 
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by reference to goods that do not figure in their own ethical lives. 
Instead, the envy test accommodates rather than disregards different 
individuals’ distinctive beliefs about how successful their respective 
lives are and, thereby, offers a method of interpersonal comparison 
that is acceptable to everyone.3 
For clarity, it is worth drawing a distinction between two 
kinds of continuity between ethics and political morality, both of 
which are exhibited in Dworkin’s account. The continuity approach 
to distributive justice refers to each individual’s distinctive ethical 
judgements to identify whether there is an inequality that is relevant 
to how we ought to distribute resources such as material goods. In 
this approach, justice does not require that I be compensated unless I 
believe that my life is less successful than another’s. Let us call this 
judgemental continuity for distributive purposes. It is contrasted with 
the different kind of continuity between ethics and political morality 
that is characteristic of Dworkin’s integration view of the 
relationship between ethics and political morality, which we shall 
call normative continuity, according to which the ideals and 
principles we have reason to pursue in politics should track the 
ethical truths that ought to guide our non-political lives. 
Dworkin’s conception of liberal politics exhibits continuity in 
both judgemental and normative senses. It does so because the truth 
about ethics includes the constraint of authenticity, which supports 
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the adoption of principles of distributive justice that identify 
advantage and disadvantage according to whether individuals, 
exercising their own ethical judgement, genuinely believe that their 
lives are better or worse than those of others. My suggestion, 
however, is that judgemental continuity is separable from normative 
continuity and can be defended on the basis of a Rawlsian 
conception that refuses to affirm or deny accounts of political 
morality that are continuous in the normative sense. Judgemental 
continuity is attractive to political liberalism because it is an account 
of justice that does not gainsay the ethical beliefs of any citizen. 
Instead, it claims that a distribution of items that satisfies the envy-
test is justifiable to everyone because no one can make a claim in 
good faith that they have less than others in the light of what matters 
to her. 
 
4. Dworkin’s Doubts 
I have suggested that Dworkin’s moral ideal of dignity might stand 
free of dignity as a guide to ethics and that his continuity account of 
distributive justice might complement rather than threaten Rawls’s 
justificatory restraints. In this section I consider the doubts Dworkin 
expresses about Rawls’s argument that political philosophers ought 
to limit themselves to public reasons. 
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 Dworkin claims that ‘Rawls’s “public reason” constraints are 
unwise and would bar his [i.e. Rawls’s] own most influential 
arguments from official political discourse’ (p. 269), and he directs us 
to his article ‘Rawls and the Law’ (2006, ch. 9) for his defence of those 
claims.4 There he argues that Rawls’s endorsement of a legal right to 
abort and his famous Difference Principle depends on arguments 
that depart from the restrictions required by public reason. 
 What are public reasons and is Dworkin right that liberal 
politics cannot be defended adequately without departing from 
them? He says that he finds ‘the doctrine of public reason difficult to 
define and defend’, but he distinguishes two construals. The first, 
which he regards as fundamental, is that ‘the doctrine permits only 
those justifications that all reasonable members of the political 
community can reasonably accept’. The second, which is supposed to 
follow from the first according to Dworkin’s interpretation, is that 
officials are required ‘to offer justifications that are based on the 
political values of the community and not on comprehensive 
religious or moral or philosophical doctrines’ (2006, p. 252) 
 With respect to the first construal of public reason, Dworkin 
argues that it either fails to exclude ethical views such as his own 
controversial account of dignity or that the exclusion of such views is 
unmotivated. It fails to exclude ethical dignity as an argument for 
particular laws if the truth of an ethical conception is sufficient for it 
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to be capable of reasonable acceptance regardless of whether others 
do in fact accept arguments that rest on such foundations. 
Alternatively, if Rawls means that the test requires others to be 
capable of accepting an argument ‘without abandoning their 
convictions of a certain sort—their X convictions’, then putting aside 
the special case of certain religious arguments, Dworkin claims that 
‘we seem to have no basis for stipulating what these X convictions 
are’ (2006, pp. 252-253). 
 Turning to the second construal of public reason—the 
distinction between political values, which are admissible, and 
religious, moral and philosophical doctrines, which are not—
Dworkin argues that Rawls’s Difference Principle and his defence of 
the legal right to abort depend on controversial moral arguments 
that flout Rawls’s own argumentative rules. Dworkin’s argument 
with respect to the Difference Principle is as follows: 
The difference principle . . . is generated and defended in 
reflective equilibrium by a set of assumptions, including 
assumptions about the fundamental moral irrelevance of 
effort or responsibility: If the arrangement that best maximizes 
the position of the worst-off group turns out to reward 
slackers, that is no objection. Rawls defends this conclusion by 
supposing that effort is influenced by endowment. So it is, but 
it is not exhausted by endowment, and the question of how 
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the interaction between the two is to figure seems a mixed 
question of psychology and morality of just the kind that 
divides different comprehensive moral views about personal 
responsibility. Rawls’s position is certainly controversial in 
our community, and some people reject it in favour of a 
theory of distributive justice that depends more on personal 
responsibility (2006, p. 253). 
 I respond to Dworkin’s doubts about public reason in three 
ways. First, I argue that, interpreted in the light of Rawls’s 
overarching project, public reason is well motivated and succeeds in 
excluding a certain class of arguments from public discourse. 
Second, pace Dworkin’s reading, I explain how Rawls defends the 
Difference Principle by appealing to arguments in public reason.5 
And, third, even if we accept Dworkin’s claim that the Difference 
Principle cannot be defended plausibly from within public reason 
alone, I reassert my earlier observation that it might remain the case 
that other attractive conceptions of justice, such as Liberal Equality, 
can be justified on that basis. 
 First, let us consider Dworkin’s claim that public reason fails 
to exclude many arguments or it is unclear on what basis it excludes 
a particular class of moral arguments. To rebut this argument 
Rawls’s idea of public reason needs to be nested within the 
overarching conception of political morality that it serves. As 
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outlined above, political autonomy—free and equal persons 
affirming the political principles and legal rules that constrain 
them—is the most relevant foundational ideal that provides the basis 
for public reason and defines its contours. In the Rawlsian 
conception, free and equal persons have interests in developing and 
exercising a sense of justice and the ability to develop, reflect on, 
revise and pursue the ethical commitments. The reasons these 
interests give us to maintain particular social and political 
institutions count as public reasons in Rawls’s view. However, the 
effect of those institutions, which protect various liberal freedoms, is 
moral and ethical pluralism. Since acceptance of the arguments for 
the rules that constrain free and equal citizens is an important 
political value, we ought to avoid siding with any particular 
controversial view within that plurality. 
 On the basis of this brief summary, it is clear that public 
reason need not be defined as excluding any moral position that is 
controversial within our community, here and now, for our 
community includes many people who reject the important interests 
that serve as the basis of Rawls’s account. Although libertarianism of 
the Nozickian variety, for example, appeals to many citizens in 
existing democracies, the Rawlsian argument that it fails to attend 
fairly to the interests of citizens is not rendered inadmissible within 
political debate by that fact. Indeed, Rawlsian public reason excludes 
 30 
arguments, like libertarian arguments, that fail to give appropriate 
attention to the interests of citizens. A view is compatible with public 
reason only if it elaborates and defends the familiar liberal and 
democratic rights and the priority of their maintenance over other 
political goals, and provides an account of social and economic 
justice that secures for all citizens adequate opportunity to make use 
of these liberties to pursue their goals (Rawls 1996, xlviii, lviii-lx). 
Conceptions that satisfy those conditions count as liberal in Rawls’s 
account, and public reason is the reason that is internal to such 
conceptions. Public reason does not, then, reflect the agreement of 
citizens of our particular society. Rather it is the reason associated 
with a family of (controversial) liberal conceptions of political 
morality (see also Clayton 2006, pp. 6-24; Quong 2011, pp. 138-160). 
 Although the political arguments Rawls appeals to are moral 
arguments that specify what we owe to each other, it is not the case 
that any moral argument that is true satisfies the requirement of 
acceptability to everyone; Dworkin’s second interpretation, 
acceptability without the need to abandon X convictions, is indeed 
what Rawls has in mind in offering ‘acceptability to free and equal 
citizens’ as his justificatory requirement. But Dworkin’s claim that 
Rawls offers no basis for his selection of what counts as an X 
conviction can be resisted by delineating the kinds of conviction that 
are respectively included and excluded from public reason. Pursuing 
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that strategy, Rawlsians may observe that reasonable citizens are 
committed to the particular set of interests reviewed above, to serve 
those interests by reference to the findings of uncontroversial science, 
and to resolve competing claims in a determinate, publicly 
acceptable and verifiable manner that treats each citizen’s claim as 
having equal importance. On this view, excluded arguments are 
those controversial moral, religious and philosophical positions that 
are not elaborations of this partially defined ideal and over which 
there is disagreement between citizens committed to that ideal.6 
Religious arguments are an example, but so too are the arguments of 
integrationists and incorporationists who disagree about how the 
political values are related to our ethical responsibilities. They are 
excluded because they cannot elicit a consensus among those 
committed to the liberal ideal of social cooperation given the 
inevitability of disagreement about the soundness of such 
arguments. By contrast, certain controversial arguments are 
included. For example, although his own conception of justice, 
Justice as Fairness, is rejected by many citizens in democratic society, 
Rawls claims that it remains consistent with public reason because it 
seeks to articulate and defend a set of political principles solely on 
the basis of the liberal conception of social cooperation outlined 
above.7 
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Turning to Dworkin’s second set of doubts, if the soundness 
of the argument for the Difference Principle turned on the truth or 
falsity of views that are unrelated to the specified interests of citizens 
or the need for fair and public rules for the distribution of resources, 
then the principle would, as Dworkin insists, flout Rawls’s own 
restrictions. However, that seems not to be the case. Dworkin is right 
to say that the Difference Principle rests on a controversial moral 
argument about how we ought to respond to income differences that 
are the product of market exchange. However, Rawls’s argument 
seems to have impeccable public reason credentials. His case is, first, 
that inequalities that are attributable to unequal endowments are not 
justified; second, that because effort is influenced by endowment, 
principles that reward according to effort cannot be just because they 
result in inequalities that are attributable to unequal endowment; 
and, third, an important feature of Rawls’s argument that Dworkin 
overlooks, that it is impracticable to fashion public rules that 
demarcate the portion of an individual’s income that is produced by 
endowment or other kinds of happenstance that, prima facie, ought 
not to affect the distribution of resources from the portion that is 
produced by factors that do justify inequality of income. 
It is not my aim here to defend Rawls’s argument. Indeed, this 
brief review considers only Rawls’s remarks against desert-based 
theories that reject the Difference Principle, and the Principle rests on 
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several further consideration that follow from Rawls’s account of 
social cooperation (2001, §§. 27-40). My limited aim has been to show 
that Rawls’s argument proceeds from within public reason. Dworkin 
is right that it is controversial and that it is rejected by many who 
accept Rawls’s partially stated ideal. Rawls acknowledges that there 
are other liberal conceptions of justice that are relevantly ‘political’ 
and conform to the constraints of public reason, some of which reject 
the Difference Principle and his arguments for it. Because that is the 
case, he accepts that an economic policy that departs from the 
Difference Principle may be legitimate, even though it would not be 
fully just on his conception (1996, xlviii-l). But the fact that the 
Difference Principle is rejected by some who conform to the 
constraints of public reason does not render it incompatible with 
public reason. It merely shows that while conformity with public 
reason rules out certain arguments as inadmissible within the 
political domain, it does not pick out a particular account of justice as 
uniquely legitimate. 
  Finally, it is worth revisiting the argument of the previous 
section, which offered an interpretation of Dworkin’s Liberal 
Equality as a conception of justice that is acceptable to everyone in 
the way understood by Rawlsian public reason. Even if we accept 
Dworkin’s argument that Rawls’s defence of the Difference Principle 
cannot be made within the constraints of public reason, it is open to 
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us to try to defend other liberal political arrangements that depart to 
some extent from those Rawls advocates. For example, I have argued 
that moral dignity and Liberal Equality might be offered as elements 
of a political conception of justice that is an attractive candidate for 
democratic adoption. If my arguments are sound, then we might 
retain Rawls’s political conception and his account of public reason 
and marry it with Dworkin’s account of liberal politics to elaborate a 
hybrid conception that combines the best features of these two 
remarkable conceptions of political morality. 
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NOTES 
                                                      
1 Bracketed page references within this text are to this book (Dworkin 
2011) unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Even though Rawlsians and Dworkinians share a commitment to 
liberal politics, they may differ in the details of political morality. For 
example, in his discussion of abortion, Dworkin argues that states 
have the right to require women who are contemplating having an 
abortion in the first trimester to undertake a process of reflection in 
which they deliberate about how best to respect the inherent value of 
human life (Dworkin 1993, pp. 151-154). It is less obvious that such a 
requirement would follow from balancing the various political 
values at stake in a political conception. 
3 Plainly, Dworkin’s resourcist account of egalitarian interpersonal 
comparison differs in important respects from Rawls’s account, 
which deploys primary social goods. Notwithstanding my positive 
remarks about equality of resources, my aim here is to defend the 
modest claim that Dworkin’s account can be nested within a political 
conception of justice. Elsewhere, I address more fully the different 
question of whether resources, primary goods, or some hybrid 
account is the right conception of interpersonal comparison (Clayton 
2006, pp. 28-35; Clayton forthcoming). 
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4 Dworkin offers further sceptical remarks about public reason, 
which I do not discuss, in Is Democracy Possible Here? (Dworkin 
2006b, pp. 64-65). For critical discussion of those remarks, see 
Schwartzman 2014, pp. 1333-1336. 
5 I do not engage with Dworkin’s argument that the political 
morality of abortion cannot be settled without engagement with 
ethical and religious arguments. I am more sympathetic to that part 
of his argument. However, it is sufficient to salvage a place for 
political liberalism to show how public reason can deal with several 
issues of public significance, such as distributive justice.  
6 To be sure, as observed above in my discussion of the ‘wide view of 
public political culture’, Rawls qualifies his view in various ways, 
such that they are excluded only if there are no matching arguments 
that can be given by reference to the political values alone. 
7 Of course, despite believing that Justice as Fairness is the best 
elaboration of the liberal conception, Rawls accepts that it is not the 
only available conception. For example, he accepts that some who 
are committed to the liberal conception argue that Justice as Fairness 
pays too much attention to the interests of those with least wealth. 
That argument is also one that can be made from within public 
reason if it is framed by reference to basic liberal commitments (1996, 
xlviii-l). Moreover, alternative liberal conceptions count as 
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legitimate, even if not fully just, if they are democratically adopted. 
Rawls and Dworkin are at one in distinguishing between justice and 
legitimacy. Legitimacy obtains when the exercise of political power is 
permissible and citizens have a normally decisive obligation to obey 
the law. Justice obtains if political association the laws of society 
perfectly match the demands of political morality (Dworkin 2011, pp. 
321-323; Rawls 1996, pp. 427-429). 
